

Trends in Communist Media 1 Oct 75

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**FOREIGN BROADCAST
INFORMATION SERVICE**

Trends in Communist Media

~~Confidential~~

1 OCTOBER 1975
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FRIS TRENDS

1 OCTOBER 1979

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KOREA

PYONGYANG REJECTS KISSINGER UN PROPOSALS ON SETTLEMENT

A 25 September DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement rejected Secretary Kissinger's proposal, in his 21 September UNGA speech, for a conference to discuss ways of preserving the armistice agreement. Pyongyang claimed it was a "replica" of the 27 June U.S. draft resolution on the Korean question, which the DPRK had already rejected at length in an 11 August government statement and 17 August Foreign Ministry memorandum. The 25 September statement, Pyongyang's first public reaction to the latest U.S. proposal, labeled "intolerable" Kissinger's contention that the ROK must be a party to any discussion on proposals for security arrangements on the peninsula.


The statement reiterated Pyongyang's position that the way to maintain peace in the peninsula was by U.S.-DPRK peace talks, not through preserving the armistice, which it claimed was "unstable" due to "constant sabotages" by the United States. It repeated Pyongyang's arguments that it was "out of the question" for the UN Command to be replaced by new parties to the armistice, and that South Korean authorities could not be a party to an armistice, since "they have all along opposed it."

The statement also strongly rejected Kissinger's proposal for dual entry of North and South Korea into the United Nations. It misquoted Kissinger as saying that the United States would "open relations" with North Korea if Pyongyang's allies did the same with the South--Kissinger actually stipulated that all parties would "improve" relations--and it called this a "plot" to create "two Koreas." Pyongyang had previously rejected a similar U.S. proposal in January 1975.*

The statement did not acknowledge or comment on Kissinger's suggestion that at the proposed conference on the armistice agreement the United States would be prepared to discuss a "larger conference to negotiate a more fundamental arrangement" on the peninsula.

A 27 September NODONG SINMUN commentary, also responding to the Kissinger speech, stuck close to the basic stand of the DPRK statement of the 25th and elaborated on several of its points.

* Pyongyang's response to the U.S. proposal advanced last November by Assistant Secretary of State Habib is discussed in the TRENDS of 15 January 1975, pages 29-30.



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The commentary clarified the statement's assertion that the Kissinger proposal was a "replica" of the U.S. draft resolution, comparing it specifically with the U.S. draft's proposal to officially replace the UN Command with officers of the U.S. and ROK armies. The commentary suggested that Kissinger's proposal was an attempt to "create disorder and complexity" in the UN debate, prompted by fear that the pro-Pyongyang draft would win approval this year in the General Assembly.

NODONG SINMUN seemed concerned to dispel the impression that Pyongyang's objections to ROK participation in discussions or arrangements for continuing the armistice meant the DPRK also was ruling out participation by the South in any discussion on future Korean security arrangements. The commentary emphasized that the pro-Pyongyang draft in fact explicitly included those questions reserved for North-South discussion, "after the armistice is replaced with a peace agreement and U.S. troops are withdrawn from South Korea." It also stressed that the draft made a "clear distinction" between issues to be settled between North and South and the questions to be solved by the United States and the DPRK, the "real parties" to the armistice and the only parties to be involved in replacing the armistice with a peace agreement.

The commentary did not directly discuss Kissinger's proposal for a larger conference on the Korean question, but seemed to refer to it in denouncing the "call for an international guarantee of the security of Korea, the aggressive nature of which has long been exposed."

PEKING, MOSCOW REACTION Peking responded authoritatively to the Kissinger proposal in PRC Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua's 26 September UNGA speech, discussed in the following article. NCNA also replayed excerpts from both the 25 September DPRK statement and the NODONG SINMUN commentary of the 27th. Monitored Moscow media have not yet acknowledged Kissinger's proposals. USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko's 23 September UNGA speech contained no reference to them, and Moscow's brief reports on Kissinger's speech ignored the section on Korea.

CHIAO KUAN-HUA DETAILS CHINA'S VIEWS ON KOREAN ISSUE AT UN

Chinese Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua countered Secretary Kissinger's 22 September proposals for a Korean settlement with a 26 September UN speech which, among other things, rejected Kissinger's proposals and blamed the United States and South Korea for the continued stalemate on the issue. Chiao went

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beyond standard PRC propaganda in charging that the United States had become "panicky" after Indochina, had declared it would use nuclear weapons in Korea, and had played up the threat of an invasion from the North as a pretext to justify the continued presence of U.S. troops in Korea and thus perpetuate the division of Korea. Chiao did not accuse the United States of actually fomenting war, though he did note that "if there is a danger of war" it is from the South, "absolutely not" from the DPRK.

Making the PRC's first authoritative response to the U.S.-sponsored draft resolution on Korea, Chiao termed it "absolutely unacceptable" and claimed it could not lead to a peaceful settlement. Chiao also introduced new substantive and propaganda elements to the PRC's public stand on Korea:

+ Chiao contended that dissolution of the UN Command "must be coupled with the withdrawal of all foreign troops from South Korea." Both are standard Peking demands, but Peking had not previously linked them so explicitly in its own statements. Chiao did not assert, as Pyongyang has, that dissolution of the UN Command meant the end of the armistice. NCNA replays of DPRK statements on 11 and 17 August had shown sensitivity on this issue, dropping this assertion by Pyongyang; but a 2/ September NCNA replay of a NODONG SINMUN commentary did include it.

+ Chiao suggested that in view of the North-South agreement on reunification by peaceful means, it should be possible to agree on "some necessary measures" to settle the problem of a temporary demarcation line pending reunification. Chiao neither specified what these measures could be nor which parties would be involved in negotiating them. Chiao may have merely been referring to wording in the final section of the PRC co-sponsored UN draft resolution on Korea, which calls on both North and South Korea to take "practical measures" for removing the possibility of military confrontation.

KISSINGER PROPOSALS

Chiao did not refer to Kissinger by name but rejected the "U.S. representative's" proposal that parties to the Korean armistice hold a conference to discuss ways of preserving it. Chiao claimed that such a proposal was "of no avail," since the parties to the armistice have "changed a great deal." Implying that China no longer regarded herself as a party to the agreement, Chiao recalled that the Chinese People's Volunteers had long since withdrawn from Korea, and he also noted that "most components of the UN Command have disappeared and evaporated into thin air."

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Chiao was careful to specify throughout his speech that only the "real parties" could negotiate and reach a peace agreement to replace the armistice. Chiao clearly implied that the only "real parties" left were the DPRK and the United States, though he never explicitly said so.

Chiao did not specifically reject Kissinger's demand that the ROK must be a party to any discussions on future security arrangements. His silence on that point seems consistent with Peking's reluctance, until recently, to support Pyongyang's objections to the ROK being included in such arrangements. NCNA replays of DPRK statements on 11 and 17 August and 25 September omitted these objections by Pyongyang. However, the 27 September replay of a NODONG SINMUN commentary retained Pyongyang's objections to South Korean participation, suggesting that Peking's position on the issue might be shifting.

Chiao claimed that Kissinger's proposal to explore the possibility of a larger conference to negotiate a more fundamental arrangement on Korea was "even more impractical" than holding the smaller conference on continuing the armistice, because of alleged U.S. "sabotage" of past attempts at talks to settle the Korean question. Describing the "tremendous efforts" in Geneva in 1954 by North Korea and the PRC to convene a political conference on the Korean problem, Chiao charged that the United States "single-handedly slammed the door" to such a conference while the "U.S. representative, stubbornly and arbitrarily clinging to his own course, went so far as to refuse to reopen any discussions on the Korean question in the future."

CCP DELEGATION DEPARTS KOREA FOLLOWING "GOODWILL" VISIT

A CCP delegation headed by Politburo member Chang Chun-chiao returned to China on 27 September after a six-day stay in the DPRK, ending the first high-level Chinese public visit to North Korea other than for a major anniversary since Chou En-lai's trip in April 1970. DPRK and PRC media emphasized the "goodwill" aspect of the delegation and gave little indication that the trip had any substantive purpose.

The delegation's activities included a 21 September Pyongyang banquet, visits to Kim Il-song's birthplace and various monuments, mass rallies in Nampo on the 23d and Pyongyang on the 26th, and a farewell banquet in the capital on the 26th. The delegation was received by Kim on the 24th, and Chang met with Kim again the next day. In his speech at the 26 September banquet, Chang characterized the discussions with Kim as "intimate talks . . .

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on questions of mutual interest," while the Korean speaker at the banquet, Political Committee member Yang Hyong-sop, called them "friendly talks of weighty importance." There were no reports of any other formal talks, although Yang also referred to "comradely and friendly" talks between the CCP delegation and KWP members at which there was a "complete consensus of views" on "questions of common concern."

In his several speeches during the visit, Chang stayed within the parameters of Peking's standard line on the Korean issue, but seemed to adopt somewhat tougher language as the visit progressed. At the 21 September banquet he supported Kim's three principles and five-point program as the correct path for Korean reunification, condemned the United States and the Pak Chong-hui regime for attempting to perpetuate the division of Korea, and supported the DPRK demand for "complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea." At the rally on the 23d in Nampo he included a demand that the UN Command be dissolved. Finally, at the Pyongyang rally on the 26th, he demanded that "U.S. imperialism must withdraw all its aggressor troops and military equipment" from the South, and expressed Chinese support for the "just struggle of the South Korean people." The KCNA text included--but NCNA excerpts of his speech omitted--Chang's accusations that the United States had increased military aid to the Pak regime and that the Pak "clique," "patronized and instigated by U.S. imperialism," was increasing tension on the peninsula by military provocations against the North.


In several of his speeches Chang included standard anti-Soviet barbs, referring to the "superpowers," "hegemonism," and "modern revisionism." KCNA carried what were apparently full texts of these speeches, including the anti-Soviet references. Previously, DPRK media replays of Chinese speeches have included references to the "superpowers" and "hegemonism" at least as far back as October 1974, but Pyongyang is not yet known to have made such references in its own name.*

DPRK speakers at functions for the CCP delegation repeated standard Pyongyang propaganda concerning the United States and South Korea. For both the Nampo and Pyongyang rallies, NCNA carried more extensive excerpts of the remarks on these subjects by Korean speakers than did KCNA. For example, NCNA--but not KCNA--cited

* It was erroneously stated in the TRENDS of 24 September 1975, pages 15-16, in a discussion of the Chang Chun-chiao visit, that KCNA coverage of Chang's 23 September Nampo rally speech was the first replay of such anti-Soviet references by DPRK media.

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the Korean speaker at the Nampo rally as noting the North's task to give "powerful backing to the fighting South Korean people and to prepare for the great revolutionary transformation of reunification" by strengthening the "revolutionary base" of the North.



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PRC FOREIGN RELATIONS

CHIAO UN SPEECH RESTATES PEKING VIEWS ON SUPERPOWERS, DETENTE


PRC Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua's initial address to the UN General Assembly on 26 September elaborated upon China's recent positions on international issues but did not depart markedly from the established line, although it offered unprecedented detail on the PRC position on Korea.* Chiao emphasized the growing world danger of superpower-initiated war--especially from the Soviet Union--showed concern over possible gains for Soviet-sponsored detente following the Helsinki European Security Conference, and amplified China's stand against the superpowers and in support of the developing Third World countries on specific issues dealing with Africa, the Middle East, disarmament, and international economic affairs.

Sharply rebutting superpower claims of an "irreversible process of detente," Chiao stressed the enhanced danger of a "new world war" stemming from U.S.-Soviet world rivalry, reiterating Peking's now standard formulation that "whether war gives rise to revolution or revolution prevents war," the future will be "bright." Last year, by contrast, Chiao had stressed the then-prevalent PRC view that revolution, not superpower war, was the "main" international trend, and he had been more sanguine than in this year's speech that world popular opinion had successfully "seen through" the "smokescreen" of superpower detente.** The foreign minister showed special concern over "deceptive" Soviet detente propaganda following the Helsinki summit, bluntly warning that "it would be dangerous indeed" to "be so naive as to believe in the Soviet propaganda." Chiao designated the Soviet Union as the major threat to peace, asserting flatly that "the danger of war comes mainly from the wildly ambitious social-imperialism."

Though Chiao had ignored Moscow's Asian security plan in his 1974 speech, this year he accused Moscow of drumming up support for the plan so as to "fill the vacuum" left by the United States in Asia, a charge in line with recent PRC comment. Linking Soviet designs in Europe and Asia, Chiao added a unique charge that Moscow was also using propaganda on Asian security to cover its prime

* For discussion of Chiao's remarks on Korea, see pages 2-4 in the Korea section of this TRENDS.

** Chiao's speech last year is discussed in the TRENDS of 9 October 1974, pages 17-18.



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
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objective of gaining European control. Underlining the point, he reaffirmed the past Chinese judgment that Moscow was making a "feint to the East while attacking in the West."

Without mentioning Asian states by name, Chiao lauded Asian resistance to superpower "hegemony," hailing particularly the Southeast Asian states' efforts to create a regional zone of peace, "new progress" against hegemonism in South Asia (an apparent allusion to the Bangladesh government changes), and the Iran-Iraq accord in early 1975 assisting the growth of Persian Gulf states' unity against outside interference. Chiao claimed that the Soviet Asian security plan's alleged provision for recognition of existing frontiers was designed to legalize Soviet occupation of the territory of "some Asian countries" and to support "one Asian country"--meaning India--in violating its neighbors' boundaries.

On specific issues:

- + Chiao reiterated harsh Chinese charges that the USSR was the instigator of the recent Angolan civil war, but noted for the first time that the United States was also involved there. "The other superpower . . . has not lagged behind," he declared. He disclosed for the first time that, following the January 1975 Portuguese agreement to grant Angola independence, China had stopped giving "new military aid" to the three competing Angolan liberation movements, rejecting recent Soviet "slanders" that China was using military aid to foment Angolan civil strife. Chiao also reaffirmed standard PRC opposition to the "dialog" with white minority African regimes, and he underlined long-standing Chinese support to the OAU call for reliance on armed struggle while engaging in negotiations to bring about complete African liberation.
- + On the Middle East, Chiao was harsher than last year in criticizing both the United States and USSR by name for their efforts to gain influence in the area at the expense of Arab interests. In contrast to last year, when Chiao described the situation following the October 1973 war as "excellent," this year he flatly claimed that the Middle East has reverted to a "no war, no peace" situation as a result of superpower meddling. Though acknowledging each of the Arab-Israeli disengagement agreements, Chiao claimed that the Middle East question was far from settled, criticized the United States as having "no intention of bringing about a thorough settlement," and lambasted the USSR as "still less inclined" to reach a complete accord. Going to unusual lengths to explain ulterior U.S.-Soviet motives



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in the area, Chiao alleged that the no war, no peace situation allowed the competing superpowers to expand their spheres of influence, sell armaments, and test new military equipment.

Chiao backed off from past explicit Chinese statements of support for returning Arab territory from Israel and for Palestinian national rights, blandly pledging this time that China would continue support for the Arab and Palestinian peoples' "just struggle against the Israeli aggressors."

+ Chiao's discussion of disarmament focused criticism on Moscow's proposals. He dismissed the Soviet plan for a 10 percent reduction in military budgets, with the savings going to aid developing countries, as "drawing a pie to satisfy hunger," and he said China was "firmly against" convening a world disarmament conference at this time. Such a conclave would only create an "illusion of peace," he declared, as the superpowers remained unwilling to meet China's preconditions on non-first-use of nuclear weapons and withdrawal of forces stationed abroad. Chiao said the recent Soviet proposal to end nuclear weapon tests was "old ware in new wrappings," but seemed to show sensitivity to widespread foreign irritation over China's continued atmospheric tests by not repeating China's usual rationalization for such testing. He rebuffed the Soviet call for a ban on manufacture of unspecified weapons of mass destruction as mere propaganda designed "to direct attention from the immediate issues by talking about remote things."

+ On international economic relations, Chiao went beyond last year's effusive praise for the Third World, noting that the developing countries, by extending their unity and struggle "from the political to the economic sphere," "have ushered in a new stage in the revolutionary cause of the people of the world." He routinely lumped the United States and USSR together as opponents of Third World interests, but played up growing cooperation between the developed European countries and Japan and the Third World raw material producers. Acknowledging the need for more assistance to the poorest developing states, Chiao defended raw material groups such as OPEC against charges that they were impoverishing such nations, adding that it was "groundless" to talk about a "fourth world" of neediest countries.


NCNA COVERAGE A 23 September NCNA report on the UN General Assembly debates of the previous two days contained explicit criticism of Secretary Kissinger's address and Foreign Minister Gromyko's speech, calling them superpower efforts "prettifying" and defending the two countries' "hegemonic behavior." The report cited only those passages in Kissinger's

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address that showed a firm U.S. stance against the USSR and underlined Washington's interests in closer ties with Western allies and East European countries. Gromyko was sharply rebuked for his disarmament proposals, his stress on European and Asian collective security, and alleged "sham support" of the Indochinese peoples. Last year a similar NCNA report had rebuked Gromyko but had remained silent on the content of Kissinger's speech. As usual, NCNA promptly reported without comment the 28 September dinner hosted by Kissinger for Chiao Kuan-hua.



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VIETNAM

DRV, PRG FOREIGN MINISTRIES SCORE SECOND U.S. VETO OF UN MEMBERSHIP

The 30 September U.S. Security Council veto of DRV and PRG membership in the United Nations was promptly condemned in DRV and PRG Foreign Ministry statements on 1 October. In comparison with the Vietnamese statements reacting to the previous U.S. veto of the UN applications on 11 August, the DRV statement was somewhat more critical of the United States, while the PRG statement slightly moderated its previous harsh statements of hostility.*

DRV STATEMENT The DRV statement went beyond Hanoi's protest of last August, accusing the United States of "stubbornly" keeping its "extremely perfidious and hostile attitude" toward the Vietnamese people, and it dropped the August statement's reiteration of Hanoi's standard offer to normalize relations with the United States on the basis of U.S. respect for Vietnamese sovereignty and implementation of Article 21 of the Paris agreement on Vietnam. It charged that the United States "continued to turn a deaf ear to reason" in "brazenly and arbitrarily" barring Vietnamese membership.

The latest DRV statement avoided any reference to the second U.S. veto being linked to the question of South Korean membership, unlike the 12 August DRV statement, which had called the Korean issue part of a "scheme" to North and South Vietnam from joining the United Nations. The U.S. position based on admission of South Korea to the United Nations was acknowledged, however, in what Hanoi's VNA on 1 October called a "joint statement" by the DRV and PRG made public in New York by PRG "permanent observer" at the United Nations, Ambassador Dinh Ba Thi. This statement noted that "whenever the United States needs a pretext to oppose Vietnam's entry into the United Nations, South Korea on U.S. orders renews its UN application." The DRV statement did reiterate the earlier charge that the United States had violated the spirit and letter of the UN Charter.

* The 12 August DRV and PRG Foreign Ministry statements on the first U.S. veto of UN membership for the DRV and PRG are discussed in the TRENDS of 13 August 1975, pages 3-4.

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Taking consolation in assessing the international "warm support" for its UN application--noting that the General Assembly vote of 123-0 for the question's reconsideration was the "strongest manifestation of the common trend"--Hanoi's statement hailed its "great political success." It repeated Hanoi's intention expressed in the August statement of pursuing a "peaceful and friendly policy toward all nations." It noted that the "obdurate" attitude and "outmoded policy" of the United States has driven Washington further into isolation.

PRG STATEMENT The 1 October PRG Foreign Ministry statement similarly pointed to the "overwhelming" 19 September UNGA vote as a "great success" for Vietnam and a "bitter failure" for the United States and as reflecting the "common trend among all nations to assess accurately Vietnam's role and stand on the international stage."

While the new PRG statement charged that the United States "still refuses to draw a lesson from its defeats in Vietnam" and is "stubbornly pursuing a hostile policy against the Vietnamese people" in violation of their "national rights" and counter to the "legitimate interests of the U.S. people," the statement did not "vehemently condemn" the United States Government in the name of the PRG Foreign Ministry, as the somewhat harsher 12 August statement had done. The statement also stated that the "stand of the PRG as well as of the DRV government is to develop friendly relations with all countries. . .and to normalize relations even with the United States." The 12 August PRG statement had not explicitly referred to normalization with the United States.

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LE DUAN DELEGATION SIGNS AID ACCORD, DEPARTS CHINA

The somewhat unusual--but not unprecedented--handling by Peking and Hanoi of the conclusion of the China visit by a DRV party-government delegation led by VWP First Secretary Le Duan and Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi suggests that negotiations may in fact be continuing and that a second Vietnamese visit may take place later to complete signing formalities for additional agreements. Le Duan and most of the DRV delegation, which arrived in China on 22 September, departed for Hanoi from China's Kwangsi Province on 28 September.

The Vietnamese left without hosting the usual reciprocal banquet in Peking, and there has been no joint Sino-Vietnamese communique, a protocol custom followed with Le Duan's last official visit to China in June 1973. The only announced results of this visit were an agreement on an interest-free Chinese loan to the DRV and a protocol on the supply of general goods to Vietnam in 1976, both signed in Peking on 25 September. Evidence that additional PRC-DRV agreements may be forthcoming was suggested by the fact that DRV Vice Foreign Trade Minister Ly Ban, a delegation member and a key figure in past DRV economic negotiations with China, remained behind; he was reported present by NCNA at the PRC National Day reception in Peking on 30 September. Also, Le Duan's departure from Hanoi for Hungary on 1 October, on an "official friendship visit" at Hungarian invitation, would suggest a tight schedule for Le Duan and the delegation members, most of whom also accompanied him on his China visit, that might require leaving further negotiations with the Chinese to Ly Ban and aides.

BACKGROUND ON RECENT ECONOMIC MISSIONS

The absence of a Vietnamese reciprocal banquet and a joint communique and the apparently limited amount of announced

PRC aid would imply that further economic negotiations are upcoming. Similarly unusual treatment characterized the 1974 visits of a DRV economic delegation led by Le Thanh Nghi to conclude Sino-Vietnamese aid agreements for 1975, although Le Duan's presence this year might have produced a different pattern.

Last year the "government economic delegation of the DRV" arrived in Peking on 1 August 1974, held talks with PRC officials, was feted at a 2 August Peking banquet hosted by Chinese leaders, toured Chinese provinces and was reported by NCNA to have "wound up its visit to China" and departed for home on 8 August. No aid agreement was reported during the visit. Eleven weeks later, NCNA reported the 25 October arrival in Peking that day of a DRV government economic delegation led by Le Thanh Nghi, specifying

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that the visit was "a followup" to the August official visit. After conferring with Chinese leaders, signing aid agreements for 1975 and attending a banquet hosted by PRC officials, the DRV delegation was reported by NCNA on 28 October as having "wound up its official visit to China" and left Peking for home. During neither of that delegation's stays in China was there reported a reciprocal banquet hosted by the DRV side. The rank of the DRV delegation evidently required no joint communique marking the visit. Paralleling recent events, Ly Ban, a member of the delegation both in August and in October 1974, remained in China during the intervening 11 weeks.

**DRV DELEGATION'S
DEPARTURE FROM PRC**

After welcoming festivities and consultations in Peking,* the DRV delegation this year attended a 25 September ceremony at which PRC Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien and DRV Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi signed an agreement on "China's interest-free loan to Vietnam," and Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Li ChLang and Ly Ban signed a "protocol on China's supply of general commodities to Vietnam for 1976." The delegation left Peking on the 25th for Tientsin with a "grand sendoff ceremony" and in the company of CCP Politburo member Yao Wen-yuan. On the 27th the delegation proceeded on to KwaiLin, where it was feted and escorted by Kwangsi leader Wei Kuo-ching, a CCP Politburo member. Le Duan departed KwaiLin and arrived in Hanoi on the 28th, just two days before his departure for Hungary.

Peking did not report deputy delegation leader Le Thanh Nghi's apparently separate departure from China for Moscow, but the Moscow domestic radio reported that he arrived there on the 29th, and another Moscow broadcast on the 30th noted that Le Thanh Nghi had been received by USSR Deputy Premier Baybakov, with whom he discussed "further economic cooperation" between the USSR and the DRV.

**VISIT ATMOSPHERICS,
PREVIOUS AGREEMENTS**

Following Peking's relatively restrained welcome for the Vietnamese, the Chinese media's treatment of the latter stages of Le Duan's visit remained less effusive than that marking his June 1973 visit. NCNA reported that Mao Tse-tung had a "cordial conversation" with Le Duan and Le Thanh Nghi on 24 September in an "atmosphere full of friendly sentiment." During the 1973 visit NCNA had reported that Mao and Le Duan had had "an extremely cordial and friendly conversation" in an "atmosphere brimming with fraternal sentiments" and it also quoted expressions of support

* The DRV delegation's initial activities are discussed in the TRENDS of 24 September 1975, pages 12-14.

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and solidarity made by Mao and Le Duan during the meeting. NCNA's characterization of the current Peking sendoff for the delegation to Tientsin lacked the degree of warmth employed in reporting the delegation's departure in 1973. Vietnamese media treatment of the delegation's stay, however, has maintained the warmth and cordiality throughout the current visit that had been applied during Le Duan's visit in 1973.

Peking's reported grant to Hanoi of an "interest-free loan" and a supply of commodities seems to fall considerably short, thus far, of its assistance to Vietnam this past year, even allowing for the reduced obligations in a postwar situation. In 1974 China signed an agreement on "non-refundable" Chinese economic and military assistance for 1975, an agreement on the mutual supply of goods and payments for 1975, and a protocol on China's "gratuitous" supply of military equipment and materials for 1975 in addition to the protocol on China supplying Vietnam with "general goods."

HANOI HAILS SEATO'S DEMISE, BLAMES BANGKOK FOR LACK OF TIES

Hanoi has reacted along predictable lines to the 24 September decision by the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) to dissolve the alliance, with a 27 September NHAN DAN editorial hailing the "forced dissolution" as a victory for Southeast Asian peoples and a symbol of the "bankruptcy" of the U.S. "global strategy of aggression" in the "key area of Southeast Asia." NHAN DAN used the occasion to admonish the United States for its continued "hostile attitude" toward the Vietnamese people in the United Nations, and also to criticize SEATO member states--including Thailand's leaders specifically--for maintaining their ties with "U.S. colonialism."

NHAN DAN's reference to Thailand was consistent with other recent North Vietnamese comment criticizing the lack of progress toward establishing DRV-Thai diplomatic realtions, comment which has reiterated Hanoi's desire to establish relations while placing the blame entirely on Thailand and its military links with the United States. As DRV media had done in July and August--following initial negotiations on normalizing relations that were held in Bangkok in May--a 24 September NHAN DAN commentary held Thai authorities "fully responsible" for the "present frozen state" of relations.*

* For discussion of previous DRV criticism of Thailand, see the TRENDS of 6 August 1975, pages 19-21 and 13 August 1975, pages 4-6.

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SEATO DISSOLUTION NHAN DAN's 27 September editorial said the decision of the SEATO Council, meeting in New York, to disband over the next two years "surprised no one" since this "reactionary and aggressive military organization has never been strong" and because SEATO's fate was "inexorably linked" with the collapse of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia.

While boasting that SEATO's collapse meant that U.S.-led "aggressive imperialism and colonialism" had been "continually pushed back step by step and toppled part by part," NHAN DAN warned that the "U.S. imperialists" have not buried all their "ambitions and schemes along with the corpse of SEATO." It criticized the "Ford-Kissinger administration" for its "hostile" and "stubborn" attitude and "warlike policy" toward the Vietnamese and Southeast Asian peoples and for "trying to prove" that the United States was still strong despite its "stinging defeats in Indochina." NHAN DAN described "U.S. neocolonialism, Japanese monopoly capitalism, and the pro-U.S. forces" in Southeast Asia as the "big obstacles" to the advancement of the nations in this region.

This editorial's only reference to the stalemate in DRV-Thailand relations negotiations came in a passage arguing that while the Southeast Asian peoples sought to break their dependence on "U.S. imperialism," there were "some persons in the ruling circles" in the region who wanted to maintain relations with the United States and see it continue as a "stabilizing force in Asia." NHAN DAN said the "deplorable attitude and actions of the Thai authorities toward the DRV" were "... clear instance" of this position.

THAILAND-DRV RELATIONS ISSUE Other recent comment on the question of stalled DRV-Thailand negotiations on the establishment of diplomatic relations has shown a degree of impatience on Hanoi's part. Commentaries in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN and NHAN DAN on 23 and 24 September berated the "unfriendly" attitude of the Thai government and charged that its actions "belied its words" about improving relations with Vietnam.

The NHAN DAN commentary of the 24th, as summarized by VNA, pointed out that Thai Foreign Minister Chatchai had "attempted to blame" Vietnam for the "deteriorating situation" in relations "created by Thailand itself," and that the foreign minister said he would visit Hanoi when the DRV "moderated its criticism of Thailand." It then catalogued continued U.S. military ties and activities based in Thailand. NHAN DAN noted with some optimism that the previous negotiations had achieved "basic results" and that "only specific questions remain to be solved," but that the Thais had refused to act in line with the "trend of peace, independence and genuine neutrality" and to detach themselves from "dependence on the United States."

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SOVIET-ISRAELI RELATIONS

MOSCOW MEDIA SILENT ON USSR-ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING

Moscow's silence on the 24 September private meeting in New York between Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Israeli Foreign Minister Allon is consistent with Soviet media treatment of other reported high-level Soviet-Israeli contacts since 10 June 1967, when the USSR broke diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv.* Presumably Moscow chooses not to acknowledge such contacts to avoid conveying the impression, particularly to Arab observers, that it might be considering improving or even restoring Soviet-Israeli relations. Moscow has on occasion, however, acknowledged low-level, unofficial Soviet contacts, most recently in a brief 1 October TASS report on the conclusion of an Israeli delegation's visit to the USSR. Gromyko, in his UN General Assembly address this year, did not mention the issue of Soviet-Israeli relations, although in his UNGA speech last year he had reiterated Brezhnev's June 1974 formulation to the effect that real progress in a Mideast settlement would create conditions for the development of relations with all Middle East states.

UNOFFICIAL CONTACTS In contrast to its reticence on high-level contacts, Moscow has sometimes publicized various unofficial contacts and exchanges of visits by low-level delegations. However, there has been only one monitored reference in Soviet media to the most recent visit of an Israeli delegation to the USSR, when TASS on 1 October reported the 22 September-1 October visit of a five-member Israeli delegation composed of politicians and journalists. Since the period of this visit encompassed the Gromyko-Allon meeting, Moscow may have sought to avoid speculation that the meetings were related; a Moscow-datedlined dispatch in the British Communist Party organ, MORNING STAR, on 27 September cited an Israeli source as cautioning that the two events should not be linked. In contrast, Israeli media--as with past Soviet-Israeli contacts--have speculated at length on possible connections and implications of the recent meetings, generally along lines favoring improved relations with the USSR.

* Past contacts ignored by Moscow—but reported by U.S., Israeli, West European, Chinese, and some Arab media--include several meetings since summer 1970 between Soviet and Israeli ambassadors in Washington and a meeting between Gromyko and Foreign Minister Eban at the time of the Geneva Mideast peace conference in December 1973.

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In acknowledging previous low-level meetings and delegations, Moscow has attempted to justify them by suggesting that they illustrate the popular appeal of the Soviet "peace policy" and way of life; occasionally the contacts have been placed in the context of a Soviet-Israeli "friendship movement." Such contacts have included--in addition to mutual visits by delegations concerned with sports, medicine, religion, and journalism--visits to the USSR by groups of Israeli "progressive public figures" invited by an organization such as the Soviet Peace Committee to "study Soviet life" and meet with their parliamentary, journalistic, and/or academic Soviet counterparts.

CRITICISM OF CONTACTS As with past Soviet-Israeli contacts, Moscow's recent meetings have subjected it to criticism from Arab and Chinese sources. A Cairo radio commentary on the 26th, for example, denounced the "duplicity" of "rejectionist elements within the Arab homeland and outside it" who declare one policy and pursue another, citing the secret development of Soviet-Israeli relations as an example and referring to the Gromyko-Allon meeting and the recent Israeli delegation visit. Peking, too, wasted little time in charging, in a 26 September NCNA dispatch, that the Gromyko-Allon meeting was "glaring proof" of Soviet-Israeli "collusion" against the Arabs, pointing out the simultaneous Israeli delegation's USSR visit and recalling that the USSR had sent two envoys to Israel last April.*

Although presently ignoring such criticism, Moscow has occasionally responded defensively to past speculation in world media that Soviet-Israeli contacts could be a harbinger of improved--or even restored--relations and would, in any case, imply weakened Soviet support for the Arabs. Referring to attendance by a Soviet delegation at a 20-22 January 1972 conference of the "Israeli-Soviet Friendship Association" in Israel, for example, a 17 March 1972 NEW TIMES article defended the visit against charges that it was part of a "mythical 'Soviet plan for rapprochement with Israel.'" Earlier, criticism of a 1971 Israeli delegation's visit to Moscow was handled through TASS publicity for a Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF article stressing that, contrary to "hostile propaganda" by some concerning the visit, the USSR had "not taken a single step backward" in support of the Arab cause.

* Moscow and Peking have previously exchanged accusations about each other's reported contacts with Israel. PEOPLE'S DAILY lambasted Moscow in a January 1972 article for having sent a "good-will" delegation to Israel; Moscow in turn accused Peking of "backstage intrigues" with Tel Aviv. For details, see the TRENDS of 2 February 1972, pages 35-36, and 11 August 1971, pages 24-25.

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USSR-ISRAEL
RELATIONS

The most recent authoritative statement of Moscow's position on restoration of diplomatic relations with Israel was made by Brezhnev in a 14 June 1974 speech in which he said that the Soviet position on a final Mideast settlement was well known and that "progress in the field of settlement will create the conditions for the development of our relationships with all countries of the Near East." Subsequent Soviet comment on the issue generally followed Brezhnev's formulation, as in Gromyko's 24 September 1974 UNCA address when he protested accusations that Moscow's Mideast position was "one-sided" in favor of the Arabs and added: "Progress which is not illusory but real in the matter of a Near East settlement will create the preconditions for the Soviet Union to develop relations with all Near East states, including Israel."

Prior to Brezhnev's Junⁿ 1974 speech, the Soviet position since June 1967 had been exemplified in such remarks as those by Kosygin at a 5 April 1973 press conference in Stockholm, reported in the 13 April Soviet NEW TIMES. Asked whether the USSR should not have diplomatic relations with Israel, as well as with the Arab states, if Moscow wished to contribute to a Mideast settlement, Kosygin replied that it would be possible "if Israel and the Arab countries were in the same position." But he emphasized that, on the contrary, Israel was "the aggressor in the Near East" and that the Arab states were "struggling for the return of their native land." Under such conditions, he said, the USSR could only condemn Israel and help the Arabs.

Recent Soviet statements have blurred the issue of what the exact preconditions for improved relations with Israel would be--whether "progress" toward a settlement or the actual conclusion of a "settlement on a just basis." A report on an Israeli Communist Party visit to the USSR in June 1975, for example, carried by TASS on 13 June and published in PRAVDA on the 15th, stated that "settlement of the Near East question on a just basis will create favorable preconditions for the development of the Soviet Union's relations with all, without exception, states of the Near East, including Israel."*

* Delegations of the pro-Moscow Israeli CP, led by party secretary general Meir Vilner, have visited Moscow at least every other year--in June 1973, December 1971 (when Vilner met with Demichev) and June 1969 (when Vilner was received by Brezhnev, after attending the international communist conference in Moscow that month).

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MBFR

WARSAW PACT LINKS PROGRESS TO NEW WESTERN INITIATIVE

The seventh round of the Vienna force reduction talks got under way on 26 September with Moscow and the East Europeans expressing guarded optimism that the talks could lead to concrete results if the Western countries adopted a "realistic" approach. While acknowledging that the negotiators have a difficult task, Warsaw Pact commentators have emphasized the need to move ahead quickly now, suggesting that the successful conclusion of the European security conference in Helsinki has set the stage for progress in the achievement of military detente. By contrasting the Pact's "conciliatory" attitude to the West's "intransigence" and recalling previous Pact "concessions" to Western proposals, comment has made it quite clear that the communist countries believe the ball is now in the West's court, and several commentators have openly hinted that a new Western initiative is expected in the seventh round.

As for previous MBFR sessions, comment by Moscow and the East European participants has been limited and on an unauthoritative level, with Soviet leaders making only perfunctory mention of the current round. Foreign Minister Gromyko, in a brief reference to the talks in his UN General Assembly address on 23 September, said there must be an agreement that will not harm "anyone's security," a theme continuously expressed in communist media. Gromyko added only that the Soviet Union would contribute "in every possible way" to the success of the talks. Oleg Khlestov, the Soviet Union's chief delegate to the talks, did little more than echo Gromyko when he spoke to correspondents upon arriving in Vienna, but he did note that there were now "new, more favorable possibilities" for advancing the work.

The West's proposals at the Vienna talks, based on an assessment that the Warsaw Pact has a numerical superiority in ground forces and tanks, have evoked a Moscow counter-argument that there is an "approximate equilibrium," a historic "balance of forces" that has prevented the outbreak of conflict for more than 25 years. Thus Moscow has argued that NATO's proposals--calling for any asymmetrical reduction of ground forces without taking into consideration air forces and tactical nuclear weapons--would upset the existing balance and give NATO a unilateral advantage. Defending the Soviet position, Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress, in a broadcast in German on 23 September, recalled that "numerous" statements at various times by "Western officials" have implied that there are "no disproportions" in the balance of forces in central Europe. The radio reported Defense Secretary Schlesinger as saying in July 1973 that the

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situation in Europe was "fairly stable" and the United States "would like to keep it that way," and quoted West German Defense Minister Leber as saying as late as July 1975 that there is a state of "dynamic balance" in Europe.

POLISH COMMENT The most detailed discussion of the seventh round and of the issues dividing the sides came in an article by Andrzej Rayzacher, Poland's leading MBFR commentator, in the 10 September issue of ZYCIE WARSZAWY. Rayzacher described "definition of forces" as "one of the chief controversial problems"--an issue that is "substantive" rather than "technical." Rayzacher criticized NATO for its "stubborn insistence" on the "so-called common ceiling" on manpower and the two-phase asymmetrical reduction proposal which, he alleged, would allow the West European NATO countries to "increase their troops." Here, and two other times in his article, Rayzacher hinted at the Warsaw Pact's concern over the West German military force. He argued that under the Western plan only U.S. and Soviet forces would be reduced in an initial phase, with reduction of the other NATO armed forces "to be worked out" in some future phase. This vague scheme, Rayzacher stressed, would leave 75 percent of NATO's forces, most significantly the West German Bundeswehr, beyond the range of any reduction obligations. Recalling that NATO had refused to go along with any "acceptable freeze" on manpower while the talks were under way, the Polish commentator pointed out that the numerical strength of the FRG armed forces was increased just this year to the highest level ever. However, Rayzacher did not mention increases in the number of U.S. forces in Europe, as did Moscow in its Radio Peace and Progress commentary on the 23d.

SOVIET COMMENT Sparse Moscow comment has tended to be somewhat more polemical and less substantive than Rayzacher's article. The only Soviet press comment pegged to the new round, a 25 September IZVESTIYA article co-authored by K. Perevoshchikov and N. Polyanov, said that "never before has such great responsibility rested on the negotiators as it does now." Recalling the "spirit of Helsinki" and the "good intentions" and "firm pledges" at the CSCE, the IZVESTIYA article asserted that it was now "necessary and possible" to continue moving forward "energetically" at Vienna.

Indicating that the West European NATO countries were the main obstacles to a new breakthrough in the talks, IZVESTIYA said: "Only the United States has declared its readiness to make specific commitments regarding the reduction of its own troops." "Those Western states" whose armed forces in central Europe constitute the main part of the NATO force "stubbornly" refuse to make such commitments, the paper continued.

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Referring to the lack of results in the previous six rounds of talks and the "reckless" rhetoric of former NATO Chief of Staff General Goodpaster and Defense Secretary Schlesinger, the IZVESTIYA article questioned whether NATO really had any real desire for progress at Vienna. There must be military detente, the article stressed; there is simply "no other way, given the present correlation of European and world forces." And in conclusion, IZVESTIYA warned: "Time does not wait. It must be remembered that the arms race has its own negative logic. And it may prove to have highly dangerous consequences in Europe with its numerous states, major industrial cities and densely populated regions. Only military detente can reduce the risk of their turning into a worldwide thermonuclear catastrophe."

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C U B A

CASTRO DISCUSSES DOMESTIC ISSUES, U.S. RELATIONS IN CDR SPEECH

Prime Minister Fidel Castro's 29 September address on the 15th anniversary of Cuba's chief mass organization, the Committees for Defense of the Revolution, was moderate in tone and devoted largely to domestic issues, including the forthcoming first congress of the Cuban Communist Party. In contrast to last year's speech, which focused on Chilean affairs and harshly indicted U.S. "illegal, dirty and criminal" activities in that country and elsewhere, this year's speech did not mention Chile and dealt rather lightly with the United States.* Castro all but ignored his old enemy, the Organization of American States, which last year was berated for its "shameless and prostituted" role in failing to condemn U.S. actions in Latin America. Castro this year briefly dismissed the United States' partial lifting of the ban on trade with Cuba as "measures that do not carry much weight." In his only significant remarks on U.S.-Cuban relations, he called U.S. criticism of Cuba's support for Puerto Rican independence out of order and said "there can never be improved relations if this is to be based on renunciation of a single one of our fundamental principles."

RELATIONS WITH U.S. Castro has shown sensitivity to Latin leftists' charges of accommodation since the thaw in U.S.-Cuban relations began, and he has been at pains to reaffirm his independence and revolutionary outlook. The strident tone of his 1974 CDR anniversary speech could be partially explained by his need to comment on the then recent revelations of U.S. Government involvement in Chile and by President Ford's defense of such actions. This year Castro apparently felt less pressure to defend his revolutionary credentials, but he did respond to Secretary Kissinger's 9 September criticism of Cuban support for the Puerto Rican "independence movement." Castro rejected as unjustified "strong statements" from the United States on this subject, noting that Cuba and Puerto Rico had been "the last two colonies on this continent" and that "Cuban solidarity with Puerto Rico dates back to the last century." Castro made no specific promise of continued support for Puerto Rico, but made it clear that he would not be pressured. He insisted that Cubans were "more interested in the purity of their principles" than in any economic advantages to be gained from the complete lifting of the U.S. trade ban. He added that "we will withstand a blockade with dignity for all the time that is necessary."

* Castro's 1974 CDR speech is discussed in the TRENDS of 2 October, 1974, pages 18-20.

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
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Castro thus gave support to Cuban President Dorticos' earlier indirect response to Kissinger's criticism and, in a more muted fashion, to Dorticos' reaffirmation of Cuban solidarity with Puerto Rican independence.* Castro's remarks on Puerto Rico were singled out by prestigious commentator Guido Garcia Inclan, over Havana's domestic service on the 29th, as the most significant part of the prime minister's speech. Garcia Inclan reported Castro's rejection of "recent attacks by some Yankee authorities" and praised "our Fidel, whose honor and dignity not even the Yankees have destroyed with their dirty tricks."

PCC PARTY Castro gave considerable attention to the first congress
CONGRESS of the Cuban Communist Party, scheduled for mid-December,
 noting that "beginning with the first congress, we will
be living in a new phase of the revolution." Although Cuban media
have been publicizing the forthcoming congress, Castro had not devoted
much attention to it in his 26 July Moncada barracks speech, and his
remarks in this CDR anniversary speech were among his most extensive
to date. Castro explained that the congress would "establish the
guidelines that the people, the state, the mass organizations and
the country" will follow for the next five years, and he promised
that "our party will be extraordinarily strengthened by the congress."

The Cuban prime minister said that as a result of the congress, "our revolution will follow superior structures of organization"--a reference to the institutionalization process and administrative reorganization going on in the country, much of which is to be ratified at the party meeting. Castro also indicated that policies to be adopted at the congress would enhance Cuba's international prestige, telling Cubans that "we will be having more influence in the international revolutionary movement and we will be helping in the path toward the liberation of other peoples."

* Dorticos' speech at the recent "international conference of solidarity with the independence of Puerto Rico" is discussed in the TRENDS of 10 September 1975, page 23.



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ROMANIA - CEMA

ROMANIA ADVOCATES SOCIALIST ROLE IN WORLD ECONOMIC FORUMS

Implicitly rejecting Moscow's standard contention that CEMA insulates its member-countries against the jolts of world economic instability, an article in Romania's party daily SCINTEIA on 21 September asserted that CEMA member-countries must protect their own economies by participating in broader international forums concerned with solving the world's economic problems. Apparently aimed at justifying Romania's own participation in economic talks outside the CEMA framework, the article, written by Romania's international economics institute director Costin Murgescu, is consistent with Bucharest's efforts to identify more closely with the Third World.

Murgescu's remarks on this subject were contained in an article advocating that CEMA members diversify their economic relations. In addition to favoring expansion of bilateral cooperation with non-CEMA countries, he disputed "certain theoreticians" who he said contended that the world's economic problems should be dealt with on a "bloc-to-bloc" basis. Murgescu declared that current international economic problems could be solved only by "concerted actions at the world level" and with the consensus of all states. Although he did not identify which world organizations he had in mind, he cited the current discussions now underway within "various international bodies" on such issues as raw material supplies, food shortages, price indexing, multilateral commercial negotiations, and the reorganization of the international monetary system.

Murgescu stressed that the socialist countries must take part in these talks not only to aid the world's developing countries but also to protect their own self-interest since, in the final analysis, world economic instability has "direct and secondary effects" on the socialist economies. A continued absence of the socialist countries from these talks, he asserted, could have a "negative impact on their own development" and could "create the danger of isolating them from the world economy." In an apparent reference to the current participation of Western developed countries in these talks, Murgescu also claimed that the socialist countries' participation was imperative to "orient" the activities of these organizations "in the right direction," that is, toward democratization of international relations.

Murgescu drew particular attention to Romania's "untiring activity" to enhance the "presence" of the socialist countries in the world economy and its "numerous initiatives and pronouncements." He cited a Romanian declaration circulated at the September UN General Assembly

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seventh special session on international economic cooperation which called on "all countries" to participate in establishing a "new international economic order." In a thinly veiled criticism of Moscow and the other orthodox CEMA member-countries, Murgescu portrayed such activity as "the most telling refutation" of accusations that Romania was guilty of "narrowness" and "national isolation."

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POLAND

GIEREK REGIME SCORES POOR WORK DISCIPLINE PRIOR TO CONGRESS

Following the publication on 5 September of the guidelines for the 7th PZPR congress in December, guidelines which stressed the primacy of "work quality," speeches by PZPR First Secretary Edward Gierek and articles in TRYBUNA LUDU have frequently complained about poor work discipline, apparently forecasting the theme of the upcoming Polish party congress. This emphasis on "work" contrasts sharply with the welfare orientation of the last party congress in 1971 and, coupled with recent price increases for meat and milk, may reflect a breakdown in the rapport between the workers and Gierek's regime that could lead to a renewal of the tensions which toppled the Gomulka regime in December 1970. The new party congress guidelines stressed orthodoxy in other aspects of policy as well, underscoring the "key importance" of Poland's ties with the USSR, denouncing Maoism, and calling for a new world conference of communist parties.

The main thrust of the Gierek regime's intensified pressure on the workers was set forth in a 23 September TRYBUNA LUDU editorial article entitled "Quantity, Quality and Productivity." The article was notably blunt in calling attention to problems stemming from poor productivity, in a manner likely to further stir up worker resentment, noting among other things that the rate of average wage increases had exceeded the growth in productivity. It called for intensification of "the discipline of employment and wages," which must be adhered to with "iron-clad strictness."

The article in effect took the line that everything conducive to better performance, such as more modern machinery and favorable working conditions, had been provided, but that the workers had not lived up to their part of the bargain. Thus the article pointed out that losses due to defective production were growing at a rate that could not be offset by production of acceptable quality. The article appeared to convey the threat of piece work pay as a remedy, registering approval of the principle of monetary incentives--a system resented during the Gomulka regime as a device for squeezing more production out of the workers with little real monetary gain. The article stressed that "better remuneration: better pay for a better effort," was a principle beneficial to both the worker and the state and was socially justified.

Poor work performance and absenteeism were attacked in a Sapocinski article in the 17 September TRYBUNA LUDU, reprinted also in the same day's ZYCIE WARSZAWY, ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI, GLOS PRACY and SZTANDAR MLODYCH. The article deplored "incomplete use of the working day"

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and noted that absenteeism was "decidedly excessive" and that sickness absenteeism was on the increase. It cited statistics to show that worker productivity in 1975 was worse than last year. This year, it said, more than 100 key plants failed to fulfill their goals and had a combined production shortfall of over 23.5 billion zlotys in the January-August period, while for the same period in 1974 there were only 80 such plants with a shortfall of 805 million zlotys. A regional party paper, the Wroclaw GAZETA ROBOTNICZA, also sounded the alarm in an article on the 17th entitled "Raw Statistics" pointing out that total worker absenteeism in Wroclaw Voivodship had increased by 33 percent and "unjustified" absenteeism by 26 percent. Similarly, a 15 September TRYBUNA LUDU editorial citing laziness, dishonesty, and parasitism noted an "alarming" rise in absenteeism since 1970, including a sharp increase in 1975 over last year.

GIEREK SPEECHES

Manifesting awareness of the dangers of worker discontent, Gierek has couched his demands for better work discipline and productivity in somewhat softer terms than the party press. Thus, in discussing the new congress guidelines at the PZPR Central Committee plenum on the 4th, the Polish leader nebulously blamed "poor labor organization" for the fact that, despite the benefit of shorter working hours, absenteeism was on the rise and machines were standing idle. Attributing continued shortages of consumer goods in part to recession in the capitalist world and to the failure of agricultural production to meet increased consumer demands, he conceded that "we recently again increased the purchase prices of meat, milk, and other farm produce," for the purpose of stimulating output of these products. Gierek offered little comfort to the consumer in noting that the only remedies for this situation were improvements in production, in food processing, and "in the shaping of consumption."

Gierek issued a direct appeal for improved work discipline, at a youth meeting in Koszalin on the 6th. Following general criticism of too much waste in production due to neglect or incompetence, he called on the young workers to help boost labor productivity through improved punctuality, exactitude, and a sense of duty.

Addressing party activists at Sosnowiec mine on the 19th, Gierek reiterated his complaint at the 4 September plenum that shorter working hours had been accompanied by increased absenteeism and idle machines. On the potentially explosive meat shortage, he told his audience that his regime had tried to improve the situation by diverting meat earmarked for export to the home market and by importing more meat, but Gierek was strikingly candid regarding the lack of prospects for improvement. He predicted that meat production would not be able to keep pace with demand and that lower-bracket workers who get wage increases might have to spend their entire increments for the purchase of higher-priced meat, adding that "I am afraid there might be some more troubles here."

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CHINA

NATIONAL DAY CELEBRATIONS LOW-KEYED; NO EDITORIAL ISSUED

The celebration of the 26th anniversary of the PRC's founding on 1 October was a lackluster affair, highlighted by an anniversary eve reception given by Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping "in the name of" the ailing Chou En-lai, who did not attend, the first time he has failed to appear for the occasion. All currently active Peking-based Politburo leaders have publicly welcomed National Day except for trade union leader Ni Chih-fu, who inexplicably dropped from public view several months ago. Of those Politburo members not currently in Peking, party Vice Chairman Wang Hung-wen appeared in Shanghai and Chen Hsi-lien and Saifudin were in Sinkiang. Reports on other provincially based Politburo members are not yet available.

In his toast at the reception, Teng noted the need to "promote stability and unity" in order to attain the goal, announced by Chou at the National People's Congress last January, of building "China into a powerful socialist country before the end of the century." Teng gave a special welcome to Cambodian Prince Sihanouk among the many foreign guests and reaffirmed Chinese determination to liberate Taiwan. Notably absent at the reception were representatives of the Burmese and Indonesian Communist parties resident in Peking, who have been routinely noted at such receptions by NCNA in past years.

The anniversary was also marked by the usual round of parties and cultural events in Peking's parks, but it failed to trigger the customary RED FLAG-PEOPLE'S DAILY-LIBERATION ARMY DAILY joint editorial which has marked all National Day anniversaries since 1967, except for 1971 when the Lin Piao affair caused cancellation of most National Day events. Prior to 1967 National Day had been greeted by separate editorials in the major Peking newspapers. This year Peking newspapers carried only the usual frontpage photograph of Mao, along with several quotations from Mao's works calling for greater unity and increased production. NCNA's 1 October review of central newspaper coverage of National Day celebrations did, however, call public attention to a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial issued the same day to mark the 20th anniversary of the founding of the Sinkiang Autonomous Region. The editorial focused on the celebrations in Sinkiang to jointly welcome the anniversary of the founding of the PRC and the anniversary of establishment of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region.

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NCNA's 30 September namelist of officials attending the National Day eve reception contained no major new rehabilitees. Former PLA Chief of Staff Lo Jui-ching, the first high-level victim of the cultural revolution, who reappeared for the first time two months ago for Army Day, appears to have been assigned to new official duties within the central military apparatus. Lo was named, without title, among several central military leaders attending the reception. Lo was criticized during the cultural revolution for seeking to place professionalism and military technique above politics, and his rehabilitation underscores Peking's current stress on improving military training for the PLA.

PRC STRESSES NEED FOR MATERIAL INPUTS TO AGRICULTURE

In the wake of China's national agricultural conference at Tachai, which began on 15 September with Teng Hsiao-ping and other top leaders in attendance, PRC media have stressed agricultural capital construction and mechanization as the basic means for achieving significant production increases in the coming five-year plan period.* The slogan guiding the campaign calls for development of Tachai-type counties, continuing a stress on the county as an economic unit which has been evident during the current five-year plan ending this year. Unit self-reliance is still the watchword in agricultural development, although Hsiyang County deputy secretary Wang Chin-tzu noted in a conference speech reported by NCNA on 29 September that 17 percent of the county's mechanization funds were gained through "state investment," indicating there is at least some flexibility on the issue.

Discussions of the conference seem to indicate no major moves toward communization will be made during the five-year plan period. Wang noted, for instance, that ideological education on the "communist goal" must be carried out, but stated the need to "correctly adhere to the socialist principle of to each according to his work." A 26 September commentary by a PEOPLE'S DAILY correspondent noted explicitly that all "important policies which deal with the system of ownership and distribution must be handled with caution. They must not be casually changed, or still less replaced by self-designed policies."

A Kwangsi provincial broadcast on 20 September discussed in some detail the problem of propagating communism while practicing socialism. It noted that "some comrades" worried that propagating communism might "violate and undermine" present economic policies.

* Initial PRC reportage on the Tachai conference is discussed in the TRENDS of 17 September 1975, pages 23-24.

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The broadcast stated that "we must think of communism while working on socialism" and must encourage voluntary moves toward communist norms. However, it warned against regarding "the fostering and propagating of buds of communism as a license for immediately changing the socialist policies," and that premature implementation of communism would "obstruct and sabotage the growth of communist factors."

The Tachai conference has placed special emphasis on the role of local party committee leadership, calling it the "key issue" in developing Tachai-type counties. In addition to the usual injunctions that party committee members retain close relations with the masses and that ideological reforms continue, the 26 September PEOPLE'S DAILY commentary directly addressed the issue of leadership instability because of ideological campaigns. It stated that adjustments and consolidations of "a few" leading groups were necessary in building leading groups ideologically, but that efforts must be made to "maintain the relative stability of cadres to a certain degree."

One area in which there seems to be some uncertainty as to priorities is agricultural capital construction. For example, Kirin Province on 11 September noted the need to carry out both short and long-term capital construction projects, with "stress laid on efforts for this autumn and winter." Kiangsi radio on 21 September also stated that water conservation priority must be given to small projects, not "big and modern" ones. On the other hand, by 21 September Kirin radio was stating that "priority should be given to major projects," though it still noted the need for speed. The later Kirin broadcast, summarizing findings of a provincial conference, stressed making concerted efforts on large projects one by one and espoused strong leadership, high quality, and the need to budget "sufficient funds and materials."

There also seems to be some confusion over whether any personnel may be diverted to capital construction before the end of the harvest season. The Hupeh provincial radio on 26 September stated categorically that before completion of autumn farm work "we must not divert the labor force to capital construction on a big scale." A KIANGSI DAILY editorial on 21 September had seemed somewhat less adamant in stating that, even before the harvest, areas "should arrange some labor power to carry out farmland capital construction," and in demanding that year-round teams be set up for capital construction.

While leaving no doubt that agriculture was the most important factor in China's economic development, recent reports have continued to pay attention to the concept of a balanced economy,

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with industrial growth spurred by agricultural output. The 26 September PEOPLE'S DAILY commentary stated that agricultural development determines the speed of national economic development as a whole, and it noted the goal of Tachai conference participants to "achieve an overall modernization in agriculture, industry, national defense and science and technology." The commentary quoted a delegate from Liaoning as saying that to achieve modernization in agriculture, industry, national defense and science and technology, agriculture was most important. The delegate allegedly criticized Liaoning's past tendency to stress industry rather than agriculture. Similarly, a Fukien broadcast on 24 September declared that "only when agriculture has been developed" can "we accelerate the pace of the modernization of our industry, national defense, and science and technology."

The reassurances that agricultural development will aid development in other sectors may be necessitated by misgivings felt by those in other sectors that they are being neglected. Extensive capital construction and diversion of even more industrial resources to agricultural mechanization implies that, until the completion of "basic" mechanization scheduled for 1980, resources will be scarce for full modernization in other areas. The inclusion of national defense among those sectors dependent on agriculture is an indication that recent efforts to better prepare the PLA for battle must still take a back seat to agriculture, perhaps to the discomfiture of some army leaders.

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NOTES

MOSCOW ON OPEC PRICE HIKE: Consistent with Moscow's traditional support for higher oil prices, an unattributed Arabic-language commentary broadcast on the 28th voiced approval of the decision by the OPEC ministers at the 24-27 September Vienna meeting to increase crude oil prices by 10 per cent. The commentary--the only monitored Moscow comment thus far on the price hike--portrayed the ministers' agreement as "defending the sovereignty and independence" of the oil-producing countries. The commentary made no direct reference to the heated dispute among the OPEC ministers over the size of the price increase, but it did label the agreed-upon increase as "extremely modest" and "motivated by the hope" that the West would adopt a more flexible stance at the Paris energy talks to be resumed 13 October. The commentary portrayed the West as continuing to ignore the interests of the oil-producing countries and "again attempting to blackmail and intimidate" them. Thus, the commentary asserted that "Washington" had warned OPEC that a price hike would "harm relations between the United States and the black gold exporters"--an implicit reference to Secretary Kissinger's 16 September remark that another price increase would severely damage U.S. efforts to establish new relations with the oil producers.

MOSCOW ON SPANISH EXECUTIONS: Soviet media promptly reported the 27 September execution of five Spaniards convicted of killing policemen or civil guards, rounding up the wave of West European and other protests and adding condemnation of their own in routine-level comment and denunciations by Soviet public organizations. The "Francoist murderers" and "butchers of the Spanish people" were denounced in statements by Soviet youth and women's organizations, according to TASS on the 29th, and a dispatch the next day added protests against the "monstrous crime of the Franco regime" by a Soviet peace committee and the Soviet jurists association. A similar flurry of media comment and public organizations' statements had assailed the December 1970 trial of Basque "patriotic democrats." Commenting on the present executions, PRAVDA on the 30th predicted that the day was not far off when the "sinister dictatorship" would be swept away. As for Western reaction, IZVESTIYA political commentator Vladimir Lapskiy, in an article reported by TASS on the 29th, observed that "even those Western circles" which had shown indulgence toward Madrid in the past few years had displayed indignation, and it was hard to find a "bourgeois paper" which did not condemn the Spanish regime for the "reprisals." Moscow has only indirectly noted Washington's cautious reaction, expressed in the White House spokesman's remark on the 29th

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that this was a Spanish internal matter, unconnected to the current U.S.-Spanish base negotiations, and that President Ford had "expressed regret at the cycle of violence." TASS political commentator Vladimir Goncharov remarked on the 30th that "those circles" which had been trying to bring Spain into NATO were now keeping silent, aware that "such attempts at the moment could completely compromise the bloc which is advertised as the "stronghold of Western democracy."

MOSCOW ON NATO MANEUVERS: A Moscow television feature in early September carried an unusually positive reference to NATO advance notification of this autumn's maneuvers in West Europe, but its impact was later blurred by Soviet press criticism of the NATO maneuvers. The remark was made by Soviet radio and television commentator Aleksandr Druzhinin, participating in a 9 September panel discussion of the European security conference with TASS Director General Zamyatin and IZVESTIYA Chief Editor Tolkunov. In the television discussion--just now available--Druzhinin, responding to remarks by Tolkunov on the Helsinki CSCE document, said: "The measures on mutual trust that you dealt with and which are a part of one of the document's chapters have already produced concrete results. A few days ago the United States, the FRG and Canada informed the Soviet Union three weeks in advance that military exercises by NATO forces would be held in the FRG next month. They did so of their own free will, voluntarily. Could one imagine under the conditions of the cold war that lasted so many years the powers resorting to such an act of good will? Would they have been able to compose a clause on trust that is now part of the Helsinki document? Of course not." The remark preceded negative assessments in the Soviet press--PRAVDA on the 15th and IZVESTIYA on the 23d of September--which acknowledged that NATO's advance notification was theoretically in keeping with "confidence-building" provisions of the Helsinki accord but nevertheless charged that the maneuvers, coming so soon after the July CSCE summit, were not in keeping with the "spirit" of Helsinki. (Negative Soviet press reaction to the maneuvers was discussed in the 24 September 1975 TRENDS.)

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DPRK ECONOMY: Pyongyang announced on 22 September that the DPRK had prefulfilled the six-year economic plan (begun in 1971) more than a year ahead of schedule and, more importantly, before the 30th anniversary of the Korean Worker's Party on 10 October. A report by the DPRK's central statistical board carried by KCNA on the 22d claimed the plan had been fulfilled in "gross output value" one year and four months early in industry. Figures in the report show that goals in steel, iron and cement have not yet been met, but the report said targets for steel and cement would be fulfilled in terms of "production capacity" by 10 October. A 23 September congratulatory message from the party central committee, central people's committee, and administration council and other DPRK comment portrayed the achievement as having laid a foundation for attaining the "ten perspective goals of economic construction," goals the party's 8th plenum in February 1974 had said were to be attained "in the years of the next perspective plan." Current comment did not allude to a new economic plan, and a 24 September KCNA report noted only that the "ten perspective goals" were to be met "in the coming few years."

SOUTH VIETNAM PRICE CONTROLS: Citing the need to "struggle against speculation and manipulation of prices" in South Vietnam, the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) on 22 September issued two new regulations requiring the posting of prices for "all" types of goods and services and establishing a PRG commodity and service price list. The 22 September pricelist regulations--broadcast by Saigon radio on the 24th--follow in the wake of a high-level PRG statement of the 10th launching a mass campaign directed against the influence of South Vietnam's entrepreneurs who remained behind after the communist takeover, and the PRG announcement on the 22d requiring conversion of former GVN currency to new banknotes issued by the National Bank of Vietnam. The latest regulations called for prices to be posted by "all state-run and joint state-private business organizations, trading cooperatives, and private individuals" and included such diverse items as rice, gasoline, fertilizers, cigarettes, newspapers, and steel rods used in construction. As a possible adjunct to the economic crackdown, South Vietnam authorities have accelerated the drive to return city dwellers to their "native places" in the countryside. Hanoi radio on the 29th reported that as of mid-September, 191,623 compatriots had been returned from the Saigon-Gia Dinh area.

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 22 - 28 SEPTEMBER 1975

<u>Moscow (2767 items)</u>		<u>Peking (811 items)</u>	
UNGA 30th Session	(5%)	DRV Party-Government	(--)
[Gromyko Speech	8%	Delegation in PRC	16%*
USSR Stakhanovite	(--) 4%	[DRV-PRC Economic	(--)
Movement 40th Anniversary	7%	Agreement	3%]
[Brezhnev Reception	(--)	Korea	(--)
China	4%	[CCP Delegation	9%
U.S. Astronauts in USSR	(7%) 6%	in DPRK	(--)
Gromyko in Canada	(--)	UNGA 30th Session	8%]
	4%	[Chiao Kuan-hua	9%
	2%	Speech	(--)
		Tachai National Agricultural Conference	3%]

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

* This figure excludes brief reports on Mao Tse-tung's meeting with DRV delegation.